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Becoming engaged, surprising oneself
We are always already engaged, in spite of us and prior to all volitional, 
deliberate or articulate act of engagement. However, we can also become 
engaged: that is, we become answerable to the pervasive social norms and 
resources through which we come to be formed as engaged and engaging 
subjects. Occasionally, we might also become critically engaged in these 
established matrices and definitional closures of subjectivity that render 
and condition us as intelligible and relational beings. And we might do so 
in ways that are not unilaterally and hopelessly subsumed by the unjust 
and injurious logic of these matrices. In other words, such formative modes 
of subjectivation can serve a performative enactment of social and political 
engagement. This would be about an incalculable performativity of engage-
ment (but also an engagement with the performative), which implies the 
indeterminate forces of responsiveness, critical displacement, vulnerability, 
persistence and resistance.
What interests me here is to think about this intertwinement between ‘al-
ways already engaged’ and ‘becoming engaged’ beyond a register of 
chronological and teleological transition from the ‘already’ to the ‘not yet’. 
This would require unsettling the division between a primary power, or 
interpellation, which constitutes and forms the subject and a secondary 
force of self-originating self-in-becoming as external to those constitutive 
powers of subjectivation. Instead, the intertwinement between ‘always 
already engaged’ and ‘becoming engaged’ invokes the way in which per-
formativity takes place as a situated contingency: incessant, non-teleological, 
and unattainable – because it is through its unattainability that engagement 
is sustained.
This performative conjunction of ‘always already engaged’ and ‘becoming 
engaged’ seeks to address the inherently ambivalent and undecidable pow-
ers of subjectivation: subjects are constituted and regulated, but in contin-
gent, differential, unforeseen, and contestable ways, in ways that both 
involve and might displace the terms of subjectivation. The performativity 
of critical engagement (as much as the critical engagement with the per-
formative) is always implicated in the nexus of that which it seeks to con-
test (Butler 1993: 1997).
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Engagement as exposure
This is all about the sociality of engagement. Being engaged amounts to 
being reflectively situated and reconfiguring that very implication – in the 
nexus of that which critical engagement seeks to contest. And yet, one’s 
engagement can never and entirely be assumed as one’s own. It can occur 
only with others and through others. It concerns becoming available to 
each other. In our critical engagements, we are enmeshed with others, we 
get injured by others, and we take courage from others. We let ourselves 
be affected, altered, pluralized, exceeded, and prompted by several singular 
pluralities and plural singularities, to recall Jean-Luc Nancy. Our capacity 
and desire to engage critically with the world is indebted to this multi-
layered relationality. In this sense, I would claim that engagement is a 
self-deconstructing mode; a mode of self-reconfiguration, which does not 
concern the self, but rather indicates a condition of becoming exposed to 
the other than oneself. Engagement, then, depends on one’s own constitutive 
disjointedness and openness to others. In this way, we might think engagement 
not in terms of autonomous and sovereign activity, but rather as inter-active 
and inter-passive process “of relating to norms and to others” (Butler in 
Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 68): in other words, as an ongoing and ir-
resolvable dialectic of affecting and being affected.
In Being Singular Plural, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests the word conatus would 
be aptly translated as ‘engagement’. In his words: “To be responsible is not, 
primarily, being indebted to or accountable before some normative author-
ity. It is to be engaged by its Being to the very end of this Being, in such a 
way that this engagement or conatus is the very essence of Being” (Nancy 
2000: 183). For Nancy, engagement is linked to the responsibility of a 
certain connectedness. We are already responsible even before we assume 
responsibility. Responsibility is akin to what Nancy calls a “law without law” 
(loi sans loi). We are always already before this law without law – one that 
does not offer guidelines or prescriptions as to how, when, and with whom 
we should act. We are corporeally enmeshed in, and exposed to, it; and 
this exposure is what unceasingly constitutes our existence as co-existence 
(être en commun).
Engagement, then, entails being and becoming exposed; being and becom-
ing answerable to others; appearing to others, and with others, in the world. 
As Nancy has shown evocatively, it is a matter of ‘singular plural’ existence, 
infinitely connected with the experience of freedom as ‘the affair of exist-
ence’. He writes: “The fact of freedom, or the practical fact, thus abso-
lutely and radically ‘established’ without any establishing procedure being 
able to produce this fact as a theoretical object, is the fact of what is to be 
done in this sense, or, rather, it is the fact that there is something to be done, 
or is even the fact that there is the to be done [à faire], or that there is the 
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affair [affaire] of existence. Freedom is factual in that it is the affair of 
existence” (Nancy 1993: 31, italics in the original). The question what is 
to be done, implying that that there is something to be done, is not reduc-
ible to the managerial logic of executing a plan. Rather, as much as it implies 
a pressing and urgent need, it is the overcoming of the logic of teleology, 
causality and immediately present effectivity. In Nancy’s words again: “History 
is perhaps not so much that which unwinds and links itself, like the time 
of a causality, as that which surprises itself. ‘Surprising itself’, we will see, 
is a mark proper to freedom” (Nancy 1993: 15).
The question of what is to be done, as a question which affirms, again and 
again, that there is something to be done, amounts to the register of 
praxis – including, of course, the praxis of thought – as an opening of time 
and space, which comes into being precisely through producing its own 
agents. Indeed, there is no agency that precedes the exposure to the ‘with’ 
of being-with. Furthermore, the register of praxis cannot be caught in the 
closure of either self-sufficient, self-affirming, free-willed agency (akin to 
liberal and libertarian individualism) or the deterministic subjection to a 
metaphysical power construed negatively as constraining system and univocal 
meaning. Rather, situated between and beyond these two outposts, engaged 
praxis is always that which opens the political to the incomplete, unforeseeable, 
and coexistential historicity of ‘surprising itself”.
Deconstructing actuality
Arguably, there can be no event without surprise (Critchley and Derrida 
1994). The configuration of ‘surprise’ evokes here the political promise of a 
coming actuality, an actuality to come, or an actuality that comes to unsettle 
any mode of thinking existing actuality as given. So, I propose to think 
Nancy’s coexistential analysis in tandem with Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
reading of Heidegger’s existential perspective as well as with Judith Butler’s 
deconstructive account of performativity. Derrida has engaged with actual-
ity through deconstructing its normative implications of presence and the 
present. Actuality, he writes, is artifactuality, which “means that actuality is 
indeed made”. He continues by describing and deconstructing the performative 
forces that are at play in the artifactual production of actuality:
“It is important to know what it [actuality] is made of, but it is even more 
necessary to recognize that it is made. It is not given, but actively produced; 
it is sorted, invested and performatively interpreted by a range of hierar-
chizing and selective procedures – factitious or artificial procedures which 
are always subservient to various powers and interests of which their ‘sub-
jects’ and agents (producers and consumers of actuality, always interpreters, 
and in some cases ‘philosophers’ too), are never sufficiently aware. The 
‘reality’ of ‘actuality’ – however individual, irreducible, stubborn, painful 
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or tragic it may be – only reaches us through fictional devices. The only 
way to analyze it is through a work of resistance, of vigilant counter-inter-
pretation, etc.” (Derrida in Critchley and Derrida, 1994: 28).
Reality can never be fully present. It is always to be known, read, inter-
preted, acted upon, and re-enacted only within discourse and through 
performative reiteration that attempts to fix it. Although the underlying, 
non-present specificities and determinacies of actuality are never fully ac-
cessible to its agents, actuality is indeed a site of performative production. 
At the same time, there is always absence and spectrality at play in actuality. 
As a relation of simultaneous difference and deferral, the relation of the 
actual and the possible is inextricable and imperfect. Différance, then, is 
what leaves the space open for the as-yet-unrealized possibility: a possibility 
with no guarantees, no purity, and no teleological conclusion. Actuality, in 
this sense, is an infinitely undecidable articulation of the relation of the 
actual and the possible that constitutes différance. And so engagement 
entails a new thinking of the possible, which is itself riven with difference.
The aporetic structure of engagement
What is implied in this deconstructive reading of the performative forces 
that are at play in the artifactual production of actuality is the political 
gesture of engagement as aporia; or, to put it differently, the political ges-
ture of engaging with the impossible as the aporetic condition of the pos-
sible. And yet, how do we make sense of the experience of the aporia? 
Through what fictional devices – i.e., the possible as impossible, the impos-
sible as possible, or the impossible as becoming-possible – do we engage 
with it? Here is how Derrida thinks the register of becoming possible: “as 
an impossibility that can nevertheless appear or announce itself as such, 
an impossibility whose appearing as such would be possible (to Dasein and 
not to the living animal), an impossibility that one can await or expect, an 
impossibility the limits of which one can expect or at whose limits one can 
wait” (Derrida 1993: 73).
The waiting that Derrida mentions is beyond active vs. passive. It involves 
and compels being disposed toward others, responding, acting, and engag-
ing. Rather than amounting to impossibility itself, aporia engages the impos-
sible as possibilization. It carries within it the imperative to think in action 
before nonpassable borders. Engagement, as deconstructive thinking in 
action and before nonpassable borders, is a commitment to infinitely bringing 
forth and making possible what has been foreclosed by those matrices of 
recognizability that pass as ‘present actuality’. As much as engagement 
presents itself in the ontological terms that have hitherto defined presence 
and the present, it also works to transform these very terms. Thus under-
stood as deconstructive engagement with actuality, engagement remains 
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urgently attentive to the multiple ways through which the actual exceeds 
that which can at any given moment be discursively assimilable into the 
normative power of ‘given’ actuality. It indicates what is not yet and what 
renders one answerable to the other.
The politics of engagement as performative event
Taking place at the abject borders of signification, critical engagement seeks 
to contest, in Judith Butler’s words, “what has become sedimented in and 
as the ordinary” (Butler 1997: 145). It does so through working with/in 
historically situated processes of subjectivation, regulatory laws, social 
temporalities, im-possibilities, failures, embodied positionalities and rela-
tional differences. In this sense, critical engagement plays out within the 
realm of materialization, which, in Butler, concerns a historically specific 
temporal process of sedimentation of pervasive discursive effects. It emerges 
in as well as reiterates and possibly eludes or displaces “a chain of binding 
conventions” (Butler 1993: 225). The performative force of critical engage-
ment is derived from the citationality/iterability of signification: namely, 
the movement of decontextualization, expropriation and reappropriation 
that allows for a possibility of infelicitous reiteration, resignification and 
even unpredictable transformation of/within these preceding and binding 
chains of constitutive conventions. So, the possibility of alteration – as a 
space of persistent and irresolvable ambiguity – is inherent in any established 
discursive convention. Critical engagement exposes, and becomes exposed 
to, the contingent iterability of the norms and their aberrations.
The unanticipated possibility for resignification, which emerges in the 
context of differentiation and deferral of meaning, becomes the site of what 
Butler calls “opening up the possibility of agency” (Butler 1997: 15). 
Agency, however, does not indicate the restoration of a sovereign individ-
ual subject of speech and action, but rather a discourse’s iterable and 
productive force that enables the inherently unstable and ambivalent process 
of subjectivation:
“The paradox of subjectivation (assujettissement) is precisely that the subject 
who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such 
norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the pos-
sibility of agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory 
practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to 
power” (Butler 1993: 15).
Performative engagement extrapolates the multiple and indeterminate ways 
in which signification is haunted by “that which is strictly foreclosed: the 
unlivable, the non-narrativizable, the traumatic” (Butler 1993: 188). At the 
same time, deconstructive performativity relies upon discursive citationality 
as an open but situated possibility of resignification, rearticulation, and 
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change. In ‘failing’ to achieve a definitive identification and final materialization, 
the performative emerges time and again as “an exercise of articulation that 
brings an open-ended reality into existence” (Butler in Butler and Athanasiou 
2013: 130). As Butler writes: “In this sense, what is constituted in discourse 
is not fixed in or by discourse, but becomes the condition and occasion for 
further action” (Butler 1993: 187). It is precisely this ineradicable caesura that 
enables the always unprefigurable, and potentially subversive, performative 
politics of critical engagement.
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